FOUR FUNERALS AND A PARTY?

THE POLITICAL REPERTOIRE OF THE RADICAL PARTY

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Abstract

The transformations brought about by changing patterns of representation, the role of the media in politics, and processes of Europeanization and globalization have challenged the political parties of the West-European left. Although some West-European left parties have been able to provide relatively successful electoral responses, the adaptation to these challenges has been extremely difficult. At the policy level, the changes have constrained the classic repertoire of the left, both when in government and in opposition. At the level of identities, they have pushed some parties to re-invent their core beliefs and re-shuffle their electoral strongholds, whilst others less successful parties have practically withered away. By contrast, classic right-wing and neo-populist parties have benefited from these four historical trends - they seem congenial to them, whilst for the left they have led to 'funerals' of traditional practices and identities. In this paper we look at the political repertoire of the Radical Party - established as *Partito Radicale* in 1955 in Italy and known today as Nonviolent, Transparty, Transnational Radical Party. The Radicals have been able to theorize and approach the four challenges quite pro-actively, possibly because most of these transformations were already in their genetic code. Scholars of new political movements, the 'new left', and the so-called third way have already pointed to examples of political repertoires that address limited aspects of the changes. But it is most unusual for a party of the left arising out of political liberalism to master a repertoire embracing global Gandhian transnational action on human rights, anti-militarism, sustainability and the fight against prohibitionist policies; a libertarian approach to scientific disorganization of the classic party apparatus, with members from different parties and parliaments; and a notion of federalism grounded in the critique of the state as institution detrimental to liberties and welfare. We illustrate this original political repertoire, appraise its achievements, and show the difference between the Radical Party and so-called fringe parties. We finally discuss the repertoire critically in the broader context of Italian and European politics.

Four funerals and a party?

The political repertoire of the Radical party

DRAFT 16 March 2011

1. Introduction

The transformations brought about by changing patterns of representation, the role of the media in politics, and processes of Europeanization and globalization have challenged political parties, especially the parties of the left. In Western Europe, the parties of the left have addressed these four transformations with variable degrees of success.[1] Some parties have withered away. Others have literally re-invented themselves. Amidst failure, adaptations and some successes, for the parties of the left the process of change has been hard and painful. At the organizational level, the transformations have reduced participatory linkages and have mutated major parties into a component of the state apparatus. At the policy level, the changes have constrained the classic menu of the left, both when in government and in opposition. At the level of identities, they have pushed some parties to modify their core beliefs and alter the electoral base. By contrast, right-wing and neo-populist parties have been advantaged by these four historical trends - they seem congenial to them, whilst for the left they have led to 'funerals' of traditional practices and identities.

In this paper we look at the political repertoire of the Radical Party - established as Partito Radicale in 1955 and known today as Nonviolent, Transparty, Transnational Radical Party (www.radicalparty.org). For us, a repertoire is a constellation of political beliefs, organizational choices and strategy. A political repertoire can be discussed in relation to evidence (that is, whether the analysis put forward by a party stands up to social science knowledge) and its internal coherence – this enables us to show whether values reverberate into organizational choice and if the strategy is coherent and mirrors the core beliefs.

The Radicals have been able to theorize and approach the four challenges quite pro-actively, possibly because most of these transformations were already in their genetic code. Scholars of new political movements, the 'new left', and the so-called third way have already pointed to examples of political repertoires that address limited aspects of the changes. But it is most unusual for a party of the left arising out of political liberalism to master a repertoire like the one we are about to describe and evaluate.

We illustrate this relatively unique political repertoire historically (that is, between 1955 and now), appraise its results (not simply electorally, for reasons that will be clarified in the remainder of the paper), and discuss its legacy both for Italian and European-global politics. We first present the four transformations in a concise form. Next we look at the thrust of the political analysis suggested by the Radical Party, focusing on their assessment of Italian political development. We then move to the repertoire of the party, examining how it has addressed the four changes in representation, the political role of the media, Europeanization, and globalization. Finally, we discuss and conclude. One qualification is in order. In describing the repertoire, we have sought to take the ideas, beliefs and documents provided by the Radical Party in a truthful and respectful way. Our aim in the core

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[1] Our argument is not necessarily confined to Western Europe, but since this is the geographical area we know, it is important that we keep our argument in scope.

sections of the paper is to describe and explain the Party and its repertoire, not to endorse or criticize it. Our appraisal of the repertoire comes after the description, when we discuss (Section 4) and conclude (in Section 5). This way, we hope, it will be easier to distinguish between evidence and their interpretation. We will show that although the Radical Party's repertoire looks *prima facie* irrational in terms of our classic propositions on the behaviour of parties (Katz and Mair, 1994), there is coherence and some degrees of effectiveness in the scientific disorganization and the 'suicidal decisions' of the party,[2] although not without tensions and limitations.

2. The four funerals

The literature on party politics shows some patterns of evolution that are common to all major democracies. One pattern is the emergence of the cartel party, described as "a fusion of the party in public office with several interest groups that form a political cartel, which is mainly oriented towards the maintenance of executive power. It is a professional organization that is largely dependent on the state for its survival and has largely retreated from civil society" (Krouwel, 2006: 252). Data on party finance show that in some countries the share of state funding on party budgets has reached 70-80% per cent (Enyedi, 2006: 235). The availability of public funding reduces a key incentive for establishing robust links with the civil society – as noted by van Biezen (2003, cited by Enyedi 2006: 235) and the party exists only because it is organically a component of the party apparatus. Kay Lawson (2006: 483) draws on the notion of cartel party put forward by Katz and Mair (1995) to summarize a vast body of research pointing to major parties colluding in cartel, thus becoming "better linked to each other than to those whom they are expected to serve". Lawson goes on to observe that participatory linkage (meaning that members play a serious role in shaping the decision-making process of the party) "has all but disappeared". We are not saying that the cartel party is the only model available, but political systems like Italy show a trend towards cartelization, especially since the left (firs the Socialist left and then the largest fraction of the Communist Party) has come out of opposition and has gradually shared governmental responsibilities with central parties.

The representational function of parties is changing. Richard Katz and Peter Mair distinguish between the *party in public office*, the *party on the ground* and the *party in central office* (Katz and Mair, 1995). In all major democracies, Western European democracies included, these three functions are under pressure. The party in public office is damaged by the trend towards cartelization, making the party less distinguishable from the state than in the past. For the parties of the left – once based on robust civil-society relations - the dependence on the state and on the functions of government is a profound challenge. The left has often made political capital of its opposition to the status quo: being 'predestined' to govern as a cartel party is in contradiction with this tradition.

As for the partiy on the ground, citizens find fewer incentives to become members of a party (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). And cartel parties need citizens less and less. Policy goals are arguably more efficiently secured by joining single-issue movements and pressure groups.

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[2] These terms have been used in the literature on the party as well by the party leaders. See Ignazi (1997) and Vannucci (2007).

Turing to parties in parliament, there has been a steady increase of the role of executive, in turn created by globalisation, international policy coordination and European integration (a point to which we will turn later on in this Section). Even in Scandinavian countries European summits have increased the role of the prime minister vis a vis the parliament (Arter, 2004). Technocratic policy-making and pressure group politics have also pushed political systems toward post-parliamentary governance (Andersen and Burns, 1996).

The parties of the West European left have historically specialised in territorial representation, linkages with the civil society,[3] and have been champions of the role of parliaments in lawmaking. The transformations of representation have not delivered good news for the traditional social and communist parties of the left. Green parties have coped with this changing environment relatively better. The new populist right has been quicker to take electoral advantage of lighter forms of parties. They are less bothered about the declining role of parliaments and party democracy, as shown in Italy but how the Northern League is led. Media-connected parties like Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* need territorial representation less than the classic party.

The crisis of party representation goes hand in hand with the rise of charismatic power of individuals, especially prime ministers and (in France) the President. This is not just a consequence of the EU summits and greater international policy coordination. It is also and arguably more importantly the manifestation of the role of media in shaping political behaviour (Bale, 2008: chapter 7; Semetko, 2006). Individual leaders – rather than parties – have exploited the advantages of addressing large audiences of citizens via the media. In contemporary political life, prime ministers address their citizens directly via television and other media. In the past, they would have gone to the parliament to communicate land-marking decisions or to resign, now they speak directly to people on prime-time television or with a video. Indeed, every day political commentators pour ink over the video appearances of prime ministers and presidents.

This trend has created an equal number of opportunities and threats to the left and the right. Parties from both sides of the spectrum have invested on the visibility of their leaders and have concentrated power and video appearances around one or few members of the parties. For ideological and historical reasons, however, the European left has always been less than comfortable for the crystallisation of power around an individual, preferring mass democratic politics, although as shown by Labour in power some left parties have not disregarded the opportunities offered by the media. The greens are probably the political formation less at ease with the link between the media and the concentration of power around leaders with charismatic power - or the more basic capability to seduce on TV. In a country like Italy, the left has been notoriously inept at finding leaders that can communicate and seduce as well as Berlusconi on television.

The media have affected party politics in another way, by opening up channels of communication that are ultimately hard to control by the traditional party apparatus. Social networks, internet-based campaigns on single issues, bloggers and digital fora are the natural terrain for movements and spontaneous groups of citizens – not for the traditional party.

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[3] We are not saying that ONLY parties of the left have done so, as shown by the social roots of Christian Democratic parties.

Television and the new media have offered new opportunity structures to political entrepreneurs of the right and far right that have amplified the politics of fear (about migration and loss of jobs) and blunt, emotional, slogan-type political messages. The *homo videns* described by Giovanni Sartori (2000) is not the *citizen* of classic democratic theory needs to perform.

Although European integration has not introduced a new cleavage in West-European party systems (Ladrech, 2006; 2010), Europeanization has affected democracy in Europe. According to a widespread interpretation (Mair, 2004), the consequence of economic and political integration in Europe is that there is politics without policy at the domestic level, and policy without politics at the European level. On the one hand, domestic elections are still the main forum for democratic choice at the domestic level. National elections, however, 'decide' less and less in terms of public policy. This is because governments are increasingly constrained by the policies of the European Union (EU) such as the single market, a single currency for the Eurozone members, a common defence and security policy, commitments taken in the area of justice and home affairs, and so on. Although the level of integration differs by policy area, there is no doubt that the Treaties have constrained policy choice at home. Thus – the analysis goes on – government and opposition in parliament may well discuss policy issues, but an increasing amount of choices are pre-determined in Brussels. As for 'policy without politics', the EU has now become an important producer of public policy, but European elections remain second-order elections. These elections are not fought by competing parties or coalitions presenting alternative manifestos to their electorates. They do not lead to the choice of an executive in Brussels chosen by the electorate. And they are not contested on the basis of genuinely European issues. For this reason, the EU level, no matter how important it is for the production of public policy, has not become a fully-fledged arena of democratic politics.

For the parties of the left, the problems of 'politics without policy' at home is compounded by the fact that negative integration (that is, the prohibition of barriers to the deep integration of markets and the freedom of movement and enterprise) has been much greater than positive integration (that is, the creation of the social dimension of Europe). According to another popular interpretation, this time provided by Fritz Scharpf (1977), there is an asymmetry between market-creating policies and market-correcting policies. Even the rights that the EU has protected the most are the rights that enable the single market to function, such as free mobility of labour and equal pay between man and women, rather than the classic full package of social rights guaranteed by the welfare state as known in West European political systems. For this reason, the parties of the left have found Europeanisation somewhat uncomfortable and politically difficult to handle. Scharpf and others have also pointed to the consequences of market integration without the complement of a European social dimension in terms of unbridled or harmful regulatory competition –as evidenced by the recurrent fears of decreasing environmental and labour standards, and in short social dumping, from the time of Portugal accession to Europe in the 1980s to the more recent vicissitudes of the directive on the provision of services across Europe.

Although this is a simplified, perhaps tabloid version of Europeanization and there are several caveats and qualifying propositions (Schmidt, 2002, Radaelli, 2004), it is fair to say that the major problems have been for the parties of the West European left. For the Communist and some green-red parties across Europe, European integration has been and still is 'other' in terms of core values. Some green parties still consider the EU as the Europe of big capital and multinationals – a political entity to critically engage with, if not to attack. For the social-democratic parties, Europeanization

provides a contested territory where hard trade-offs and policy dilemma have to be solved (Hopkins, 2004). The implementation of European policies has reduced the room for policy choice and encouraged reforms at home in different domains such as pensions, competition policy, and labour market regulation that have been painful for social-democratic parties linked to Unions, although in some cases ingenious solutions and clever compromises have been found (Giddens, 1998; Levy, 1999; Visser and Hamerijck, 1997).

Parties of the right have been either supportive of market integration and relatively less concerned about social dumping and the lack of 'social Europe'; or, in their populist version, have seconded anti-European sentiments and found convenient to blame the European Commission and deep economic integration in Europe for the transformations under way and the increasing uncertainty about jobs and welfare provision at the domestic level. Far right parties have capitalised on anti-European sentiments and fears of un-restricted migration flows in an integrated Europe.

On the international scene, parties are perceived as less effective than NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and international organizations (Lawson 2006). The only transnational parties examined by Lawson are federations of parties and the so-called European parties – that is, the federations active in the European Parliament. After having noted that there is not much to say on transnational parties, Lawson concludes that "even the best-developed of transnational parties, those active in the European Union, do not yet play a stronger role in supranational politics than their national counterparts, nor a more democratic one" (Lawson, 2006:489). Although the Greens have been successful in pushing some issues on to the international agenda, they have been less than effective in controlling it (Lawson: 2006). Cartelization is also rife at the international level. Lawson mentions "ample evidence" that cartelization "is in fact operative at the international level, a successful parties work in collusion with national governments on behalf of the goals they jointly set" (Lawson, 2006: 489).

At the policy level, globalization blurs the responsibility for policy outcomes (see Fernandez, 2006 and the vast literature cited therein) and puts on the agenda issues like de-regulation of markets, migration, security and anti-terrorism, and the fear of emerging superpowers like China and India. Parties that are strongly attached to national goverments and the state apparatus find it difficult to engage with notions of international governance and global democracies, and often support military interventions against the preferences of the majority of citizens. The international arena also forces parties that work hand in hand with governments to enter into arrangements with non-democratic leaders, as shown by the support of the left Democratic Party in Italy for the Treaty between Lybia and Italy signed by the Berlusconi government – a treaty now condemned by many as an insult to human rights, but at the time opposed vehemently only by the Radical MPs and (with less emphasis) by another party. Lawson concludes that international politics may transform political parties into "dangerous instruments" for achieving democratic values (Lawson, 2006: 490). Although we cannot generalise, these trends are particularly worrying for the classic values of the left and the notion that left parties are instruments of democracy and human rights both at home and in the international arena.

3. What is radical about the Radicali? Concise historical background

What do we know about this political phenomenon? Previous studies have been limited to the examination of specific periods of Italian political history or the differences between one period and the next. Thus we have seen the Radical Party classified as a single-issue movement of the 'new left politics' (Hanning, 1981), a neo-populist party (Tarchi, 2003), a manifestation of anti-politics (Mastropaolo, 2005; Mete, 2006), and distinctions between the 'old' liberal Radical Party of the 1950s and the 'new left' party of the 1970s (Panebianco, 1988). An important book by political historian Massimo Teodori situates the PR (Partito Radicale) of the 1970s in the context of the rise of a new left across Europe (Teodori et. *al,* 1977). Briefly, these relatively old studies and their classifications shed light on some points, but neglect the continuity of analysis provided by the leaders of the PR which is also continuity of the history of this party. Recent studies have shed light on the organizational dimension of party politics (see Ignazi et al. 2010; Ignazi 1997 on the Italian parties and Vannucci, 2007 specifically on the Radical Party).

We are not aware of any comprehensive research project carried out during the last decade dedicated to this party. There are however short books and pamphlets on the leader, Marco Pannella (perhaps the most informative is Vecellio's book dedicated to Pannella; Vecellio, 2010), and volumes collecting his speeches at the Italian parliament (Pannella, 2007; 2008). The European Parliament has archived all the speeches of the MEPs elected in the various electoral incarnations of the Radicals. Radio Radicale has archived audio, video, and text material dating back to the 1980s. The journalist and party member Valter Vecellio has also collected several articles by Pannella and on Pannella in a precious series of books printed by the publisher Stampa Alternativa in recent years. Currently, there are periodicals culturally close to the Radicals, such as *Quaderni Radicali* and *Diritto e Liberta'* – together with a daily internet daily paper called *Notizie Radicali* edited by Vecellio. In the past the PR published its own newspaper called *Liberazione* and magazines such as *Argomenti Radicali* and *Prova Radicale*.

The Partito Radicale was established in 1955 as the result of a spin-off of the left of the Italian Liberal Party, one of the historical parties active since the Italian Risorgimento. At its establishment, the PR was already characterised by important historical traditions of liberal political theory that were never denied or changed throughout almost sixty years of existence off the party. The party was rooted in the small (in Italy at least) but culturally non-trivial pockets of liberal-democratic Resistance to Fascism, the radical liberalism of Gobetti's political magazine *Rivoluzione Liberale*[4] and Rosselli's Liberal Socialism (Rosselli,1930 [1973]) , anti-clericalism (in turn grounded in some Italian liberal ideas of the XIX century), and European Federalism.

In what sense is this party 'radical'? There are different ways to answer this question, such as tracing the main ideas, although this does not make sense in a party that is not ideological. Here we look at the political analysis proposed by the leaders of the party throughout its history. We argue that there are two ways in which the party is radical. One has to do with globalization, and will be explored later in the paper. Now it is sufficient to say that the party horizon was never confined to

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[4] *Rivoluzione Liberale* is now fully available on http://www.erasmo.it/liberale/default.asp. On Gobetti and his 'heretical liberalism' see Martin (2008).

Italy.. One of the founding fathers of the party, Ernesto Rossi, had already argued in the Ventotene Manifesto that the state had complete its historical mission and was no longer capable of delivering on liberties and growth, indeed the state had become detrimental to freedom and social justice (Spinelli and Rossi, 2001 [1943]). From his exile in Geneva, Rossi, attacking the nationalistic "federalists based in Rome" wrote in 1944 that he believed in the absolute necessity to prioritize international politics and that it was impossible to create democracy in Italy without at least framing democracy in a federal European context (cited in Pulvirenti, 2009: 97). This radical position was epitomized by the decision taken in 1989 to evolve from Partito Radicale to the Transnational Transparty Nonviolent Radical Party, of which Radicali Italiani is a constitutive movement. But we shall look at global political action later in the paper.

Now we turn to the second way in which the party strikes us as genuinely radical. This has to do with the interpretation of Italian political history. All parties that established the Italian republic in 1948 were glued by a somewhat ambiguous commitment (ambiguous according to the Radical leaders) to anti-fascism. They defined themselves as the antithesis of fascism, and drew legitimacy from this. For the Radical Party, instead, there has been legal and political continuity between the period of fascism and the Italian republic. This theme was present in the early campaigns of the 1950s against the plunder of resources orchestrated in the name of the state by the political class, and became much more fundamental in the analysis of the 1970s, as shown by Pannella's 1973 preface to the volume *Underground: A Pugno Chiuso* (Valcarenghi, 1973; the preface can also be retrieved via Radio Radicale's archive) and recently with a documentary project called *La Peste Italiana* (The Italian Pest) published on the website of Radicali Italiani and constantly up-dated.

Whilst the traditional parties saw in the late Italian Social Republic of the last months of WWII and later the Italian Social Movement (MSI) the successors of fascism, the Radicals identified the new partycratic regime that betrayed the 1948 constitution and its values as the new fascism. In this truly radical analysis, continuity is demonstrated by the large amount of laws (inherited from fascism) that contradict the constitution: a body of laws restrictive of rights and individual liberty used by fascism for only twenty years, and for much longer periods by the Republic. Political continuity – the diagnosis carries on – is proved by the patterns of consensual lawmaking in parliament, where the opposition concurs with the majority in the definition of legislation (Giuliani, 1997).

Continuity is – the Radicali's narrative goes on - the result of three factors. One is the systematic, unmitigated, subversive betrayal of the 1948 constitution and its values, to the point of effectively putting in jeopardy the rule of law in Italy. To illustrate, *La Peste Italiana* argues that the constitution gave the Italian citizens three opportunities to cast a vote, that is, (a) at national elections (b) for directly elected regional assemblies and (c) at referenda to strike down existing laws, provided that at least 500,000 citizens signed to request a referendum. Only (a) was effectively granted immediately, whilst (b) and (c) were frozen until the 1970s. Not to mention other rights that were either selectively guaranteed for very small constituencies or totally ignored. For this reasons, the Radicals have always presented their party as paladin of the constitution against the massacre of constitutional values provided by the Christian Democrats and their allies in the cartelized Italian state.

The second factor - the analysis proposed by the Radical Party goes on - is the transformation of political parties – an element of the Italian democracy, according to the Italian constitution, but not

its cornerstone – into a regime based on parties, the so-called partycracy. A feature of this party-based regime is the systematic occupation of spheres of economic and social life well-beyond the thresholds experimented during fascism and the limits set by the constitution - in line with the cartelization trends identified by political scientists. The expansion of publicly-owned areas of the economy after World War II, indeed, has simply magnified the political usage of instruments established during fascism, like the *Istituto per la Riconversione Industriale* (IRI).

The third factor is the political control of the media, in a country where the public TV and radio had already been prioritised as the quintessential tool of political control with Mussolini's EIAR (Ente Italiano per le Audizioni Radiofoniche). With time the close grip of the Christian Democrats on the Italian public broadcaster, RAI, turned into a system of spoil-system with the first TV channel assigned to the DC, the second to the Socialist party and the third to the Communists. For all these changes, though, the overall degree of political control of the media and the negation of pluralism of information did not change. Public monopoly of the media was declared un-constitutional by the constitutional court in 1976 – for the PR this was yet another proof that the regime was in defiance of constitutional values. Possibly because of their long historical view on the Italian media, the Radicals have not been particularly impressed by how Silvio Berlusconi has used the media, since they consider him a late manifestation of a pattern and a culture of control that goes back to the 1950s if not to the fascist EIAR – in line with the arguments of scholars of the Italian media like Paolo Mancini (2004).

Because of this analysis, the leaders of the PR present themselves as the custodians of the constitution and the Italian Resistance against a cartel-type regime that for them has last from the 1920s to now. Even today they call themselves *partigiani* (partisans). As Pannella observed on several occasions, the socialist-communist left saw in the Resistance of 1943-1945 an episode that had to be completed with the revolution and the establishment of a regime different from classic liberal democracy. Briefly, for the communist leaders the resistance should not have led to a liberal-democratic republic but to a regime of the Soviet bloc. In consequence, the 1948 Republic and its constitution were not fully and unambiguously endorsed by sections of the communist and socialist elites.

As for the Christian Democrats, their clerical roots made it difficult to celebrate the Resistance as the transition towards a state freed from religious influence in social and political life. It was only for liberal-democratic minorities that the Resistance was a fully-fledged, internally coherent, and 'complete' political and cultural transformation of the Italian state leading to constitutional democracy. This diagnosis is at odds with the established discourse of the Italian political class from the 1950s to now, although leaders like Berlusconi have dented the dogma of *antifascismo* on several occasions.

To put the Radicali in their historical context, we have to examine two important cultural turns. The first is represented by the counter-culture of the 1960s. Not the violent episodes of social struggle that characterised Europe between 1968 and 1972 (and in Italy 1977 with the armed factions of the so-called *Autonomia Operaia* movement), but rather the culture of the US beat communities, the Dutch provos, the European movement of conscientious objectors, the early spontaneous green and libertarian initiatives. For many years, the official Italian Feminist Movement (MLD) had its central offices inside the headquarters of the Radical Party in Rome and the nascent green movement was

federated to the party. For the Radicals, this multi-faceted message of individual freedom, liberatarianism in the American tradition of *Resistance to Civil Government* [5], strong anti-militarism and anti-establishment values was melded with the tradition of Italian non-violent Gandhian thinkers. No matter how small the communities of people influenced by Italian Gandhians like Aldo Capitini were, they were intellectually well-represented within the Radical Party. So much so that the leaders of the PR were instrumental in supporting Capitini in his first-ever anti-militarist march (1961). An earlier influence of anti-conventional thinking about peace and war had pervaded the PR at the time of the Algerian was against French occupation, with the Radical Party leaders supporting the choice of those French communists and libertarians who decided for conscientious objection rather than joining their country in an unfair war (Teodori, 1977). Thus, on the one hand the Radicals took on some characteristics of the new left in Europe. On the other, these characteristics were rooted in the pre-existing intellectual influence of Gandhian political thought.

The third and perhaps more radical transformation, which leads us to the response to one of the four epochal challenges introduced above, came with the transnational turn. But this is a key element of our narrative on the four 'funerals' and therefore will be addressed in the next Section.

4. Addressing the challenges

In this Section we show how the political repertoire of the Radicals has addressed the four challenges. We will examine the challenges one by one. Our aim is to present and understand the repertoire, not to appraise it. We will provide a normative appraisal in Section 5.

4.1 Representation

There are some unusual features of the responses provided by the Radicals to the decline of traditional parliamentary representation. Most of these responses were in the genetic code of the party as launched in 1955. Hence the representational menu supplied by the Radicals is not really a response to challenges that became evident only in the 1980s and 1990s, but rather a pro-active, genuinely innovative set of beliefs about representation. Representation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Consequently, we examine the 'internal side' of representation first, that is, the *party in central office* and the *party on the ground*. We then move on to discuss the 'external side', that is, how the *party in public office* represents preferences and interests in the political arena.

The principle of non-exclusive membership of the Transnational Radical Party (and reflected in the federated, constitutive movements like Radicali Italiani) is arguably the most characteristic feature of the logic of membership. Members of other parties (and even members of different parliaments in the case of the Transnational Radical Party) can join in and have typically done so throughout the years. When a citizen becomes a member of the party, she does not have to concur with any type of ideology or programmatic thought. All is requested by a member is the commitment to the annual programme as decided by the annual party meeting. This means – as party member Valeria Manieri

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[5] This was the title originally chosen by Henry David Thoreau. On 18 November 2010, Emma Bonino used one of the rare opportunities to address a large readership (an article in the weekly magazine of *Corriere della Sera*) to claim the key role of the legacy of Thoreau for the Radicali's political repertoire, linking Thoreau's civil disobedience to Luther King and Gandhi, who both admired the American philosopher and writer. See Emma Bonino, *Il Gusto e la Forza della Disobbedienza*, Sette-Corriere della Sera, 18 November 2010.

reminds us in a recent letter to the daily newspaper *Il Riformista* – that political activity for the Radicals is about uniting people with "concrete, shared objectives", or "chunks of lives and roads that are shared" and the party is like "some American houses without fence and with door always unlocked" (Manieri, 2010). At the same time, the party has never manifested an interest in developing a territorial base. There are associations in Italy and abroad, but they are not controlled by a strong organizational centre, indeed they have substantial freedom (Vannucci, 2007). There is no *party on the ground* in the conventional sense of Katz and Mair.

Besides, as Pannella is fond of saying "our party offices are the streets where we collect signatures for referenda and engage citizens". Indeed, there is only one main party office in Rome, in contrast to all the other Italian parties and their estate properties across the peninsula. This choice has made the party less vulnerable to the crisis of territorial representation of parties. Being essentially funded via voluntary contribution, the Radical Party has also escaped the trap of becoming too state-dependent. It has not transformed into a component of the party apparatus, thus defying the expectations of the literature on cartelization.

By contrast, the party has always pushed for a kind of single-issue, rights-oriented representation. With single-issue campaigns to aggregate preferences of citizens around rights like divorce, abortion, conscientious objection to the army, scientific research and so on, the party has represented rights rather than territory – a feature typical of parties and movements that draw on post-materialistic values. Combined with the principle of non-exclusive membership, this has enabled the Radical Party to gather consensus across and perhaps beyond the left-right divide and to diversify the political supply. The leaders have the same characteristics and cover a vast section of the left-right spectrum as traditionally conceived.

This vision can only work if supported by a coherent (albeit most unusual) organisational choice. Unsurprisingly then, the party has never emerged as a traditional political party. Rather, a small party nucleus of a few dozens of leaders and limited staff (Vannucci, 2007) have spun off over the years a galaxy of single-issue movements and associations. The party is a kind of holding which is very slim at the centre, where only R&D and key assets are held, and constantly evolving in terms of subsidiaries, depending on the campaigns of the moment. The result is a varied, multi-faceted supply of representation for different types of preferences and rights. Today, for example, the Transnational Transparty Nonviolent Radical Party is accompanied by several constitutive and federated movements and associations, such as Radicali Italiani, the association Luca Coscioni for freedom in scientific research and the right to decide on life-and-death medical decisions, the Association for Esperanto, No Peace without Justice, Hands Off Cain (active against the death penalty), the network Anticlericale.net (against clericalism), an association fighting prohibitionist policies on drugs, and a Radio that carries out public duties as well as reporting on the life of the party (Radio Radicale).

Taken together, the libertarian vision and its organisational counterpart provide a response to one of the classic reasons behind the decline of traditional parties, i.e. that citizens can secure selective incentives and effective representation of their preferences by using specific pressure groups and movements rather than parties. The Radicals are indeed a galaxy of single-issue campaigns that mobilise and represent citizens with different ideological preferences but glued by the commitment to a specific cause. The members have substantial input into decision-making according to the

statutes of Radicali Italiani and the Radical Party (Vannucci, 2007). The annual assembly is open to all members (there are no delegates) and it is the key decision-making body of the party (see Vannucci, 2007 on organs and statutes of Radicali Italiani and the Transnational Party). Compared to other parties, the Radical Party is open and responsive to its members. In turn, the members are free to organize their local activities as they see fit. In essence, this is a libertarian approach to organization. When viewed from the angle of traditional cartel party politics, the choice of the Radicals is one of scientific disorganization. Disorganized because the party has not developed a strong centre that controls the party on the ground. But scientific because there is wisdom in the galaxy model, which in a sense replicate corporate structures like the holding and differentiates the political supply.

Instead of investing in the *party on the ground* and the *party in central office*, the party has tried to intercept mass politics another way, using the instrument of the referendum (see Uleri, 2002 on the referendum in Italy). Recall that although disciplined by the constitution, this instrument had been frozen up to the 1970s when the Catholics – at the time hegemonic in government – activated its use to respond to parliament, which had against all odds passed a law to make divorce legal in Europe. The Radical Party was the main driving force behind the law: although at that time not represented in parliament, the party had operated mainly through civil society, the media, and a single-issue movement, the Italian League for Divorce (LID). Whilst most parties of the conventional left were worried by the prospect of fighting a referendum campaign against the Church, the Christian Democrats and their right-wing allies, the Radical Party took the higher political ground in tacking the enemies of divorce. During the referendum campaign of 1974 the left had no option than to join forces with the Radical Party, whilst the Church ran the most explicit political campaign of all times. The result was a clear victory of those who wanted the divorce to remain law in Italy, and a confirmation of the strategy to unite citizens on key issues concerning their rights rather than thinking in terms of a large majority of Catholics versus the other Italians. Indeed the divorce referendum would not have won without the votes of many Catholics that cast a ballot in defiance of the Church's instruction. Thus, not only did this referendum bring Italy closer to other democracies that separate Church from the state, it also freed up a consistent amount of Catholic vote, as proved by the spectacular success of the Communist party in the second part of the 1970s.

The Radical Party itself benefitted from this trend, getting four MPs elected in the 1976 elections. These MPs brought into the parliament several innovations. The MPs elected in the PR list were not subject to any party whip but had to represent citizens (in line with the constitutional mandate, but against current political choice in all Italian parties represented in parliament). They resigned in the middle of their mandate to give other PR candidates the opportunity to enter parliament – thus providing alternation and avoiding the ossification of representatives. And they resuscitated provisions in the parliamentary rules of procedures that had been neglected by all opposition parties, thus re-asserting the power of parliament and exposing the limitations of traditional opposition.

Going back to the referendum, this instrument became a flagship tool in the Radical arsenal, which led again on more than one referendum campaign on abortion and the historical referendum of June 1978 on party finding. As Vittorio Mete observes, aversion to public funding of parties has been a distinctive feature of the Radicali: the 1978 referendum was fought by the PR alone against all the other parties. It was lost in the end, but with 43.6% of voters in favour of the abolition of public

funding, the Radical Party secured a moral victory. Mete calls this referendum "the first, eloquent alarm bell for the Italian political class" (Mete, 2010: 43-44).

Between the 1970s and the 1990s the Radical Party used the referenda – often promoted in clusters of 8 and 10 to maximise their potential for change – to break down the legal continuity between the Italian Republic and the most hideous liberticidal aspects of the fascists regime, and to aggregate new majorities of citizens. However, the change potential of the referendum was muted by two mechanisms. One was the activism of the Italian Constitutional Court. Although the constitution specifies the cases in which a referendum on an existing law cannot take place (e.g. a tax law) the Court took a very broad approach and struck down several requests of the Radicals for referenda. The PR would collect more than the half-a-million signatures necessary for a referendum to be called, and to find out later than the Court would strike down the request to hold a referendum.[6] The implications of this attitude of the Court were particularly detrimental to the political repertoire of the Radicals, and their leaders accused the Court of anti-constitutional behaviour, more recently in *La Peste Italiana*. The other mechanism was that even in cases of victory of the YES front at the referendum, the parliament introduced new legislation mimicking the effects of the one that had been repealed via the referendum. A case in point was the second (1993) referendum to abolish public funding of political parties, this time won but then nullified by new legislation that effectively re-introduced and indeed increases the total level of funding. Other gambits to mitigate or annihilate the political impact of the referendum were used by the political class, such as limiting information on the media during the referendum campaign to increase the probability of the vote being declared null because below the threshold of 50% turnout. Or holding elections in a referendum year to buy time and delay the referendum (when there is a national election the referendum is postponed).

Today, according to the Radicals at least, the situation is practically the same it was for the twenty years in which the Constitutional provisions on the referendum were frozen: the referendum campaigns promoted by the Radicals in recent years were often lost - sometimes because of turnout below the 50% - which led to accusations of liberticidal behaviour of the media, since low turnout was the result of lack of information on public TV and radio, other times because the Court did not even let citizens vote declaring the request un-constitutional. Recently, however, Radicali Italiani experimented with the instrument of referendum at the local level, e.g. a campaign in Milan to launch a collection of referenda on the environment and public transport in the city.

We ought to complete this discussion with what for most party is the quintessential form of 'external representation' that is electing representatives to parliament. Since 1955, the Radicals witnessed both periods in which they were outside parliament and other periods with their candidates elected either in their own list or as a contingent of Radicals elected within lists representing a broad coalition (see table 1). The Radicals have been the staunchest supporters in Italy of a first-past-the-post system of representation and thus have found it congenial to coalesce in broader electoral lists (see table 1 for the various incarnations of this strategy). After having secured a ministerial portfolio for Emma Bonino in the centre-left coalition (2006-2008), today the Radicals have six MPs in the lower House (Camera dei Deputati), three senators (of which one, Bonino, is deputy-President of the Senate), and two members of the regional assembly of Latium.

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[6] In total the Court has struck down 50 requests. This is remarkable if one considers that the Constitution strictly says that referendum requests are valid if there are more than half-a-million signatures and the referendum is not on fiscal issues

One word on the meaning of 'participation to elections' is in order, however. Most of the appearances of the Radicals at national and regional elections over the last decade have been qualified by the argument that there is no sufficient political information and pluralism in the media, especially the public broadcaster, and therefore electoral processes in Italy are not democratic. Consequently, on more than one occasion the Party decided either not to present candidates (and invite the Italians to a vote strike) or to ask citizens not to vote but in any case present lists of resistance for those who did decide to vote (for the nuances of this position, see the events in Partito Radicale, 2003).

Surveys have documented that only a small fraction of the electorate, often below 5%, know that Radical lists are contesting European or national elections. Access to talk shows on prime-time television is practically zero for the Radicals. But this brings us to the political usage of the media, by the Radicals and against them – an issue to which we turn now. Here we conclude with the observation that for the Radicals the most important issues about elections have been fairness, rule of law, and equal access to the media. On rule of law, the most recent campaign is about contesting the validity of the election of the powerful head of the Region Lombardy, with the Radicals documenting that his list had been supported by false signatures. The fact that the left opposition in Lombardy and the whole country was not bothered by this is evidence of the different approach to the issue of fairness and rule of law in electoral campaigns that divides the Radicals from the other parties.

Table 1 – Electoral results at national (lower house = Chamber of Deputies, CoD) and European elections.

Elections		List	Votes	%	Parliamentary Seats
1958	Lower House (CoD)	Partito Repubblicano Italiano-Partito Radicale	405.574	1,37	6
	Senate	-	-	-	-
1968	CoD	Partito Radicale	1.540	0,00	-
	S	-	-	-	-
1976	CoD	Partito Radicale	394.212	1,07	4
	S	Partito Radicale	265.947	0,85	-
1979	CoD	Partito Radicale	1.264.870	3,45	18
	S	Partito Radicale	413.478	1,32	2
European elections 1979		Partito Radicale	1.285.065	3,67	3
1983	CoD	Partito Radicale	809.810	2,19	11
	S	Partito Radicale	548.229	1,76	1
European elections 1984		Partito Radicale	1.199.876	3,41	3
1987	CoD	Partito Radicale	987.720	2,56	13
	S	Partito Radicale	572.461	1,77	3
European elections 1989		Lega Antiproibizionista sulla Droga	430.150	1,24	1
1992	CoD	Lista Marco Pannella	486.344	1,24	7

	S	Lista Marco Pannella	166.708	0,50	-
1994	CoD	Lista Marco Pannella-Riformatori	1.359.283	3,51	6
	S	Lista Marco Pannella-Riformatori	767.765	2,32	2
European elections 1994		Lista Marco Pannella-Riformatori	702.717	2,13	2
1996	CoD	Lista Marco Pannella-Sgarbi	702.988	1,88	-
	S	Lista Marco Pannella-Sgarbi	509.826	1,56	1
European elections 1999		Lista Emma Bonino	2.631.205	8,46	7
2001	CoD	Lista Marco Pannella-Emma Bonino	832.213	2,24	-
	S	Lista Marco Pannella-Emma Bonino	677.725	2,00	-
European election 2004		Lista Emma Bonino	731.536	2,25	2
2006	CoD	Rosa Nel Pugno	991.049	2,60	18
	S	Rosa Nel Pugno	851.875	2,49	-
2008	CoD	(within the list of the Democratic Party)	-	-	6
	S	(within the list of the Democratic Party)	-	-	3
European elections 2009		Lista Emma Bonino-Marco Pannella	743.273	2,43	-

4.2 The media

Since the campaigns in the late 1960s and early 1970s for the right to divorce and the de-criminalisation of contentious objection, the Radicals have identified the media as the central political arena for their activity. In 1974 Pannella embarked on a long hunger strike (92 days) with the purpose of being able to speak to citizens on TV: the media, rather than parliament, was already the key arena for the initiatives of the PR of the time. and on several occasions with the public broadcaster RAI as main target of the strike. The 92 days of strike were for minimal, pragmatic objectives, that is to have 15 minutes on TV to talk about divorce (as well as 15 minutes for Giovanni Franzoni, a grass-root dissident theologian). In July Pannella was eventually interviewed on RAI, after a press campaign in is support initiated by PierPaolo Pasolini, a prominent Italian intellectual and columnist on the main daily *Corriere della Sera*. The day after his appearance on TV, the President of the Italian republic received Pannella, and the summer ended with a successful campaign to ask for the resignation of the head of RAI, Ettore Bernabei, who resigned on 20 September.

Either directly or indirectly the most important campaigns have targeted political information and lack of pluralism in the media as the most negative aspect of the 'regime' they fight as 'partisans'. Often this approach ties in with the production of evidence about the illegal nature of some campaigns, since, as shown in the case of Lombardy mentioned earlier on, lack of pluralism in the media is accompanied by substantial alterations of the playing field like false signatures produced in support of lists of candidates.

The public broadcaster RAI (Radio Televisione Italiana) has been the most obvious target with an endless string of attempts to gain at least minimum visibility on RAI, including hunger strikes, demonstrations, the activation of the Parliamentary committee exercising oversight on the media, reports to the Italian communication authorities and pacific 'invasions' of RAI buildings.

The relationship with the media is paradoxical. On the one hand, the Radicals have unleashed their political creativity in trying to perforate the wall of neglect erected by RAI. By doing this they have raised attention for what the party was doing, why the leaders were protesting, and so on. On the other, they have not been successful in increasing the pluralism of the public broadcaster and in getting good quality information and debates during electoral campaigns. The RAI ostracism towards them has been well-documented by public surveys of content analysis on the Italian media. Not only have the Radical Party leaders appeared sparingly on television, but when they do is only for certain issues. For example, RAI has never discussed their proposals for the economy, education and the welfare state, thus contributing to the impression that this party has little to say beyond human rights. - as lamented by the final Resolution of the 9th annual congress of Radicali Italiani, 1 November 2010 (source: www.radicali.it).

The party has also rightly spotted the subtle transformation of what is now strategic on Italian television. The key strategic asset is the presence of certain issues and certain political leaders on the main prime-time talk shows, some of which are watched by more than eight million people. In the past the key asset was the presence of politicians on the main televised electoral spaces reserved to parties, watched in the 1970s by some ten-fifteen million people and now relegated to marginal shares and marginal presence on RAI – which has de facto suspended them. The talk shows that emerged during the last twenty years have created their own political landscape, with their core political protagonists chosen in blatantly biased ways. The opposition politicians that feature in these shows and the main news are for millions of Italians who do not read newspapers and do not listen to the radio 'the opposition' in Italy. Since these are the shows were the Radicals are conspicuously absent and pluralism is violated, the argument of the Radicals is that the regime has practically silenced the true opposition. It has done so by showing on talk shows only what is claimed to be the opposition but actually organically inserted in the regime via the spoil-system of the media. Sometimes these shows present an opposition that is totally artificial in terms of presence in parliament, as shown by the insistence of talk shows over the last three-four years on Nichi Vendola, a leader that is functional to the regime since his old-style left politics has no impact on electoral flows between the right and the left.

In terms of creativity the repertoire of Pannella and the other leaders is rich, as documented by a long series of episodes that have made a bit of history of political communication in Italy. In 1978 Pannella and a very young Emma Bonino used their limited space on TV (30 minutes dedicated to parties to present their positions on a cluster of referenda) to appear gagged and silent for 25 minutes, explaining in the remaining 5 minutes that not them but the freedom of information of Italians was silenced and gagged.

Creativity apart, the leaders of the party have campaigned against illiberal, in some cases objectively fascist media laws on journalists and journalism. They launched referenda for their abrogation. In the 1970s, when the press of the extreme left (like *Lotta Continua*) ran the risk of stopping publication because they did not have an editor member of the Italian order of journalists, Pannella,

Baldinelli, Rendi, Baraghini and others offered to take on this task, without interfering with the editorial line of the newspapers. Overall, the leaders of the Radical Party gathered hundreds of trials because of the content of the newspapers they were officially responsible for, but they were almost invariably found not guilty. In this practical way, they drew attention to illiberal fascist laws on the press.

To denounce the authoritarian spirit of the laws on journalism, the Radicals asked the international academic celebrity Bruno De Finetti, one of the most important world-wide probability theorists of the last century, to take responsibility for the content of their house-organ *Notizie Radicali*. De Finetti was arrested in November 1977 because an article published by *Notizie Radicali* had supported civil disobedience against illiberal laws on the military service. He was arrested at the prestigious Accademia dei Lincei at the opening of the academic year (De Finetti and Nicotra, 2008). For once, the Radicals shot through the veil of silence of the media, and the public television had to show a few seconds of images of this mild mathematicians surrounded by the police, with placards saying 'I am a Radical, arrest me!' (the pun on radical numbers in mathematics was intended of course).

The strategy towards the media is constellated by a long string of 'scandals' – a term that for the Radicals is close the Christian and Gandhian notion of creating scandal by witnessing and researching truth (Satyagraha). Pannella created scandal on TV by giving hashish to the conductor of a talk show during one of his rare appearances on talk shows – asking to be arrested for having distributed drugs. He thus made an important point drawing on classic Gandhian civil disobedience. Episodes of civil disobedience were repeated in public at events organised to campaign for the de-criminalisation of drugs (27 between 1995 and 2004, with 14 sentences to party members). Civil disobedience attracted considerable attention and respect in Italy – a country where laws are disobeyed, but in private and disguise. The Radicals were very public in their Gandhian disobedience (not just on drugs, but also on abortion, scientific and medical research, and conscientious objection to the military service) and always paid the legal consequences of their acts in full. In xxx, the members of the executive of the party stripped naked on the stage of Teatro Eliseo in Rome to evoke and showcase the loss of liberty. Over the last ten years Cappato, Pannella, Stanzani, and Bonino have often worn the yellow star of the Shoah to mention to holocaust of starvation, but also to remind that the suffocation of liberties ends up with genocide of people. On two occasions the Radicals distributed the money they got from public funding of parties directly to citizens, on public squares, stamping each note with the sentence "this is part of the money plundered by the parties and returned to citizens".

When campaigning for elections, the party has often made systematic use of candidates who were a scandal because of their history and what they represented. This was they managed to have a single-issue campaign around the scandal-candidate. A case in point is Enzo Tortora, a very popular showman accused of dealing with the mafia on the basis of inconsistent evidence. The fact that he was candidate (with memorable speeches recorded in his house in Milan, where we was confined by the police) and then elected was instrumental to spawning a debate on the unfairness of the Italian judicial system. Tortora was elected, gave up immunity voluntary, and was found innocent, going back to his TV studio to receive a standing ovation. The PR also managed to elect Tony Negri, accused of being an architect of terrorism. However, further to his election and contrary to the

advise of the party, Negri decided to seek asylum in France rather than give up immunity and face an Italian tribunal. [7]

The hunger strike has been used as a technique of nonviolence to re-establish the rule of law or to denounce illiberal laws that stood in contrast to the Italian constitution. There are two striking features in the usage of hunger strike by Pannella and other leaders. We mention them here although they have a general valence, not restricted to the rubric of media but more generally concerned with the approach to non-violence. First, their hunger strike was always FOR something, in support of specific, often minimal proposals like 15 minutes on RAI or a parliamentary debate on the draft bills for contentious objection to the military service or abortion. It was never a strike of protest alone, or a strike AGAINST. Second, the strikes were always used in the name and spirit of the rule of law, not for an unrealistic alternative. In this Pannella is a clear heir of the enlightenment (because of the emphasis on dialogue and tolerance). The Radicali have always put on the table requests that were fully compatible with the rule of law, in a sense asking the regime to stick to its own legal principles. A corollary is that these strikes were for life and for solutions: the Radicali have always found it unacceptable to present unrealistic requests and let themselves die. Pannella reasoned that this behaviour is equivalent to throwing one's own body in front of the tyrant, a last desperate act of violence rather than an act of dialogue and tolerance. Having said that, Pannella's hunger strikes have been among the longest and hardest in political history, with more than one thirst strike - in one case Pannella went as far as to drink his own urines to carry on with the strike.

4.3 Europeanization

The affinity between the Radicals and European integration is deep and oriented towards a libertarian vision of bottom-up federalism, where European political union can thrive alongside forms of local and regional power. The vision for Europe is historically situated in the larger vision of nonviolent relations among people, and the creation of a world-wide organization for democracy.

To understand how European federalism belongs to the DNA of this party one has to go back to 1941-1943 when the liberal political theory of Ernesto Rossi encountered the liberal-socialism of Altiero Spinelli. At that time, the two were in solitary confinement on the island of Ventotene. Spinelli was on very troubled itinerary that would lead him from the Italian Communist Party to democratic socialism, via Anglo-Saxon economics and the federalism of Lionel Robbins. Rossi was an economist devout to well-regulated markets and the separation of Church and State. With the contribution of a third intellectual in solitary confinement, Rossi and Spinelli produced in 1941-1943 the Ventotene Manifesto (Rossi and Spinelli, 2004 [1943]). Rossi later became a founding father of the Partito Radicale. Spinelli was the leading figure of the European federalist movement and the main orchestrator of the European Parliament's plan for the United States of Europe (1984). The Radicals have used the Ventotene Manifesto as their road-map in European politics, and beyond. The Manifesto is frequently cited by Pannella, recently also in connection to the spread of

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[7] The case of porn-star Ilona Staller, aka Cicciolina, is different since there was no intention to create a scandal and a campaign around this candidate. As party member, she asked to be on the PR list. The leaders put her at no.49 for Latium, almost at the bottom of the list of candidates, following a strict alphabetical order. Some newspapers, however, ran with the news and effectively created a campaign for her. Perhaps to the surprise of the PR leaders, she was elected MP.

movements for democracy in the Arab world and Albania. Radical MPs such as Maurizio Turco evoked the Manifesto in their declaration on a crucial vote of confidence on the Berlusconi government on 14 December 2010.

So, why is the Manifesto the political compass of this party? For four reasons. Firstly, the Manifesto is anchored to the core value of liberty. This has supported several campaigns of the Radical MEPs in the European Parliament between 1979 and 2009 on rights and freedoms of Europeans as well as on the EU as exporter of human rights. Memorable are their campaigns for an autonomous Tibet in a free and more democratic China. Secondly, Ventotene appeals to the Radicals because of its libertarian nature (Pulvirenti, 2009). The diagnosis proposed by Rossi and Spinelli during the years in which Hitler was effectively on top of Europe (with the exception of the UK; the US was still neutral when the first version of the Manifesto was completed in 1941) was that the state had failed in Western Europe. It had failed to protect human rights and liberties. It had also failed to generate welfare. It was therefore a political and economic failure. The authors of the Manifesto took for granted that Hitler would have lost the war. However, they warned against a strategy revolving on the re-construction on the state in Europe:

"The dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer follows the formal line of greater or lesser democracy, or of more or less socialism to be instituted; rather the division falls along the line, very new and substantial, that separates the party members into two groups. The first is made up of those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of struggle as the ancient one, that is, the conquest of national political power – and who, although involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the incandescent lava of popular passions set in the old moulds, and thus allowing old absurdities to arise once again. The second are those who see the creation of a solid international State as the main purpose; they will direct popular forces toward this goal, and, having won national power, will use it first and foremost as an instrument for achieving international unity". (Rossi and Spinelli. Xxx)

Later Spinelli became very suspicious of an 'international state' centred on the bureaucracy of the European Commission. Pannella and other Radical MEPs have always put citizens and bottom-up federalism at the centre of their vision for Europe. Thus, the notion of 'international state' was re-qualified in a major way since the Ventotene Manifesto, without renouncing to the attack on the illiberal nature of the state, however. The state was deemed responsible for the pre-Leviathan conditions of Europe. Drawing on Lock, Montesquieu, Verri, Stuart Mill, Cattaneo the authors of the Manifesto stressed the instrumentality of the state. The state is legitimate only because and when it provides satisfaction to the needs of individuals and creates the legal infrastructure to protect the individual from the abuse of power of those in office. Historically, for Rossi and Spinelli as well as for the Radicals the state has failed to achieve that in Europe.

Thirdly, once we dispose of the state, one has to provide another concept for the organization of political relationship in the community. For Spinelli and Rossi this new concept was federalism as fundamental political institution for the Europeans. Not a federation of intellectuals and philosopher-kings, but a federation based on the liberties and rights of European citizens – and interestingly a leading role played by the working class. Fourthly, the Manifesto argues that the legal-political concept of war has decayed below any possible justification in terms of political or legal theory. Yet the goal of the Manifesto is not pacifism (Pulvirenti, 2009:86). As historian Pulvirenti puts it in a passionate historical reconstruction of Ventotene, the Manifesto is not a 'vote

for peace'. It is a 'vote for liberty'. This argument has been magnified and taken to its conclusions by the Radicals by embracing nonviolence instead of pacifism and by linking nonviolence to the rule of law.

Turning to EU activity, we mentioned that the Radicals have been present for thirty years in the European Parliament, but they have also secured a portfolio for Commissioner Emma Bonino, appointed in 1994 for consumers policy, fisheries and European Community humanitarian office (later, in 1997, her portfolio was expanded to include health protection and food safety). Arguably the major areas of activities of the party lie in the field of EU protection of democracy and human rights, foreign policy and enlargement. On enlargement in particular, the party has been very proactive since it has always been on the side of civil rights in the Central and Eastern European countries – Pannella was arrested in Sofia in 1968 for the distributing flyers against the USSR interference with the early democratic movements in these countries. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the activities in Central and Eastern Europe intensified, with events and annual party conferences in Eastern Europe rather than in Italy. The fall of former Yugoslavia saw Pannella, Bonino and others engaged with an ambitious attempt to both increase Europe's role in this geo-political area and to promote the rights of the ethnic minorities.

Another example of engagement with enlargement and foreign policy is the support to Turkey's entry into the EU. The Radicals have also campaigned for opening negotiations with Israel for accession to the EU – the argument being that only by embracing Israel into a community of values it is realistic to impose conditions on rights and co-existence in Palestine and the Arab world on to Israeli leaders.

Most pertinently perhaps, the European repertoire is interesting because of the usage of the EU institutions. Always a small contingent in the European Parliament, the Radicals have campaigned for specific issues, starting from a small base but gradually attracting consensus and majorities across party federations and different positions (in the Parliament, and often across the institutions of the EU).[8] This is after all the same strategy used in Italian politics: instead of taking ideological positions, the small group of Radical MPs in the Italian parliament has put on the table a number of pragmatic issues and asked other parties and the public opinion to support reform.

Choosing from a long list of episodes, we mention Bonino's active usage of the European Commission and the European Parliament to gain support for a campaign against female genital mutilations and other so-called 'traditional practices' in 28 African and Arab countries. MEP Marco Cappato led the European Parliament in a comprehensive report on human rights, approved in 2008. In 2007 the European Parliament approved with a large majority a recommendation submitted by the Radicals on pilot projects to re-convert the production of poppies for the drugs market into legal opium used in medicine as analgesic – this is one of the many initiatives against prohibitionism targeting the European Parliament and the Commission. In other cases the usage of the institutions has been on a personal basis, like when Marco Cappato went in his capacity as MEP to support the gay pride in Moscow and protested against police intimidation.

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[8] This strategy is praised by the past president of ALDE, the Liberal-Democratic Federation of the EP, Graham Watson (Watson, 2010: 173; 175).

4.4 Globalization

Yet again, to explain the repertoire in relation to globalization we have to go back to the DNA of the party. Since 1989, with the Budapest Congress, the party has become transnational and transparty (that is, a party with MPs from many different countries and parliaments). As transnational organization, the party does not present lists in national campaigns – although affiliated movements do so, but with their names and symbols. Fig.1 shows the ratio between members recruited in Italy and the rest of world: although the ambition is transnational, the appeal of the party is still stronger in Italy. But let us discuss the switch to transnational politics. One way of interpreting this transnational turn is that the Italian party disappeared and become 'bio-degradable' into a new party in 1989. But actually another interpretation is possible, as argued by one the leaders of the party, Angiolo Bandinelli (2011). He notes that this has been an evolution rather than a transformation. The inclusion of the adjective 'transnational' is for Bandinelli and the other leaders of the party (as shown by several radio conversations with Marco Pannella we accessed via Radio Radicale) a formal change in the name of the party, not an indicator of a different political strategy.

According to Bandinelli (2011: 4), since (at least) 1962 the party has embraced transnationalism and global politics as a "constitutive and foundational element". The Radical Party did not choose to add 'Italian' to its denomination for a purpose, that is, to avoid any nationalistic or even national connotation to its political activity. In 1967 the resolution of the annual congress – Bandinelli carries on - was grounded in "anti-nationalism and anti-authoritarianism". Since the 1970s the party has had many non-Italian members – and later became a 'trans-party', because over time some 80 MPs of non-Italian parties became party members. In 1978 the party elected Jean Fabre, a total conscientious objector, Secretary; Fabre became President in 1979 and was arrested in France for his anti-militarism. Belgian-born Olivier Dupuis was elected MEP for the Radicals, actively campaigning for human rights in China, Tibet and other regions of the world (he was once arrested in Laos in 2001 on a charge of damaging the country security and stability. When the Radical Party entered the directly elected European Parliament in 1979, it did so with the denomination Group of European Federalists, unlike the other 'Italian' groups.

The transnational choice was already grounded in the Ventotene Manifesto (see above). But a global political outlook became dominant in the party activity in 1979, with the launch of a campaign for the step-by-step eradication of world hunger. For this campaign the Radical Party used all institutions in which it had representatives, especially the European Parliament and the United Nations. It mobilised fifty-four Nobel Prize winners who signed a manifesto for a pragmatic gradual approach towards the eradication of starvation. World hunger has been the main focus of attention during the 1980s and the 1990s that has won the party some sympathy even within the Catholic hierarchy and Pope John Paul II. This is yet again proof that the strategy of the party is not ideological. The strategy is to select objectives and gather support on these objectives in a pragmatic way. The Radicals were not surprised at all to have the Vatican on their side, although they had fought the Catholic hierarchy on divorce, freedom of scientific research and abortion.

In the United Nations, the Radical Party is an NGOs with general consultative status represented in ECOSOC. This shows flexibility of this party, which is also an NGO in the UN context, a movement in

other contexts, a member of broader advocacy and discourse coalitions in yet other contexts.[9] The UN has been the target of another long-term initiative for a moratorium against the Death Penalty. In this case again the party has used all the possible institutional venues. It also generated the association *Hands Off Cain* – set up in 1993 with the goal of abolishing capital punishment by the year 2000. Watson (2010: 173-175) in his book on the liberals in Europe recalls how the presence of only two Radical MEPs was sufficient to turn first the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and then the whole European Parliament and the EU in favour of a UN moratorium on death penalty, with the external support of the Spanish and Italian governments. The third committee of the UN General Assembly passed a motion calling for a global moratorium on capital punishment in November 2007. In December the General Assembly approved the call of the third committee with 104 votes. In 2008 the General Assembly passed a new resolution with 106 votes (those opposing the resolution went down from 52 to 46). *Hands Off Cain* produces the most reliable data on death penalty across the world in its annual report.

Together with starvation and capital punishment, the world-wide campaign for the recognition and protection of universal human rights is the third main global issue in the repertoire. Already in 1994 the initiative 'No Peace without Justice' launched a campaign for the establishment of an international tribunal on war crimes in Yugoslavia. Today *No Peace without Justice* is an NGO that belongs to the galaxy of the party. It has successfully campaigned for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Today the main focus of the party is on the activation of international jurisdictions for human rights – there are several jurisdictions across the world, but most are used sparingly and always for the same type of cases, although their remit is potentially wider. Related to this, there is also a focus on discussing how judges and experts serving on the international courts are selected.

Finally, between 2003 and now a fourth topic has emerged in the repertoire of the Radical Party, concerning the possibility to send Saddam Hussein into exile and therefore avoiding the war in Iraq. By collating documents and declarations of top officers and politicians, the Radicals have argued that this was a very concrete possibility that was not pursued because of the interests of the bureaucratic-military complex in the USA. The presence of the Radicals on this issue has been felt in several institutional and intellectual fora – including requests to the Chilcot Inqury on the Iraq war to ask questions to former PM Tony Blair in January 2011.

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[9] On the different concepts of coalitions in policy theory see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Hajer (1993).

Fig 1 – Ratio Italian members / members from the rest of the world

Italy/Rest of the World

4. Discussion

The previous sections have shown how the repertoire of the Radicals has addressed the challenges posed by the changes in representation, the role of the media in politics, Europeanization and globalization. We have described the repertoire by drawing on the official documentation and the main ideas put forward by the party leaders. We have now to turn to appraisal and specifically address two questions. First, although parties live in the world of real politics and social scientists in the world of explanation based on evidence and scientific paradigms, it is not unreasonable to check whether what the Radical Party says is corroborated by the empirical evidence cumulated by political science. Thus, is the analysis provided by the party *grosso modo* supported by the literature on Italian and European politics? We cannot test all the positions of the Radical Party one by one, but we can say something about their analysis of Italian politics and their federalist approach to European integration. Second, we have to appraise the repertoire: what are its limitations, and what are the strengths, or at least the lessons to be drawn?

Let us start with the narratives about Italian and European history put forward by the Radical Party. Their interpretation of Italian politics is definitively unique. It may sounds bizarre. Yet it is not without foundations in social science research. Certainly the Republic is a democracy and fascism was an authoritarian regime – the two are not the same regime. Yet if one looks at substantive (as opposed for formal) aspects of democracy (Morlino, 2011) and to specific topics like the role of the media and the relationship between party and state, there is more continuity between the two regimes than one would think. In his analysis of substantive democracy across countries, Leonardo Morlino considers several measures drawn from the most reliable international sources. The claims of the Radical Party about rule of law, the massacre of constitutional values and the suppression of rights are not rejected by social science measures. Indeed Morlino shows that Italy is a low-

performance democracy in terms of civil and political rights. In his large quantitative comparative project he classified Italy in the category of 'democracies without quality' (Morlino: 2011, see chapter 8 and fig.8.9). The Worlwide Governance Indicators continue to single out an Italian exception across European democracies[10]. This dataset maps six areas: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The Democracy Barometer (www.democracybarometer.org) measures 100 indicators on the quality of democracy in 30 major democracies: in 2005 Italy was number 26 out of 30 with deterioration in indicators covering the dimensions of rule of law and representation.

Turning to specific sectors like the media, most scholars of the Italian media would agree with the diagnosis of political control proposed by the Radical Party. There are plenty of official data witnessing the systematic, almost scientific discrimination of the Radicals and the large bias in the public broadcaster's news programmes and talk shows. Possibly the other party that was discriminated against was the Northern League, which however has improved in terms of appearance on the media with its participation in government with key portfolios. In 2006-2008, the main news service on RAI (TG1) has been found guilty five times for behaviour damaging the Radicals by the regulatory authority. The other two public news services have been sanctioned four times. The main talk show on RAI, *Porta a Porta*, has been sanctioned seven times in the same period for the same reason (data from *La Peste Italiana*, p.60). Political scientists have documented how political parties have gone beyond the role assigned to them in the constitution and talk about partycracy and cartelization in their scientific publications. *La Peste Italiana* (on p.7) quotes the inaugural lecture of Professor Giuseppe Maranini in the academic year 1949-1950, in which he lamented that parties had become already "a state within the state", "threatening with their illiberalism the weak liberal-parliamentary state" – in short, cartelization.

As for European federalism, the jury is still out. It is true that the hopes of the early federalists like the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto were dashed by the political developments in the 1950s. Majone (2009) notes that the state proved to be quite resilient in the post World War II reconstruction. It did not wither away. The European Union we have today is not the kind of bottom-up federalism envisaged by Spinelli and Rossi. However, inaccurate predictions do not undermine the quality of the analysis about the advantages of federalism. They simply show that the political leaders have attended to the reconstruction of the state rather than devoting their energy to the only cause that Rossi and Spinelli deemed worth engaging with, that is, European politics. Moreover, the current changes under way in the stabilization policies for the Euro-zone and economic governance in Europe seem to suggest that a kind of federal architecture may soon become a necessity, no matter what the plans of state leaders are.

Let us now move to the second question. What are the lessons to be drawn from the repertoire we have discussed in this paper? We can quickly establish its originality. No European party we are aware of has taken classic liberal position to such an extreme, libertarian conclusion, including nonviolence as political compass, the connection between disarmament and food, opposition to authoritarianism without distinctions between Pinochet and Fidel Castro, radical internationalism and international human rights – all blended in a classic liberal position about the primacy of rule of

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[10] See the data at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.

law and the obstinate defence of political institutions (a point that differentiates them from anarchist movements).[11] It is also most unusual for parties of the new left to embrace a liberal vision in economic policy – the Radical Party is for free, competitive, non-monopolistic markets and for (regulated) free trade, in contrast to many formations of the new left which are suspicious of both markets and European integration-globalization.

In terms of organization and representation, as mentioned it is customary to consider the *party in public office* (that is, the representation in domestic and European institutions), the *party in central office* (that is, the central bureaus and the resources available at the centre) and the *party on the ground* (Katz and Mair, 1994). The strategy pursued by the Radical Party is original because defies our expectations about organizational goals (see Ignazi et al. 2010 on party organizational change in Italy). In relation to classic arguments about the rational behaviour of parties, the choices of the Radicals appear 'suicidal' (Vannucci, 2007; Ignazi, 1997: 21 cited by Vannucci). Perhaps with the exceptions of the European Parliament, the Radical Party has been more interested in winning campaigns and securing reform goals than in getting representatives elected in local or national assemblies. The central office remains small and resourced by voluntary contributions. There is nothing similar to a party bureaucracy. The statute of the party is still informed by the organizational choices made in 1967 (Vannucci, 2007). With the transnational turn of 1989, the party has not presented lists denominated *Partito Radicale* at any election, although Radicals have been elected in other lists and or in lists with the names of leaders, like *Lista Pannella* and *Lista Bonino-Pannella*. Before 1989, the party did on several occasions decide that the threshold for fair democratic electoral competition had not been met, and therefore did not present lists or invited to a vote strike (Partito Radicale, 2003). Thus this attitude towards elections is explained by a motivation rooted in concerned about substantive democratic quality and rule of law. It pre-dates the 1989 transnational turn. Turning to the *party on the ground*, the Radical Party has not pursed any policy aimed at rooting the party in the territory via local party offices connected to the centre.

All this is not necessarily irrational or suicidal if we consider the main strategy of building majorities in support of specific reforms, in Italy as well as in global and European politics. The party has shaped its organization around libertarian values, given autonomy to individual members, and placing members at the centre of the life of the party. At the same time, the party has not institutionalized a network of local party clubs and bureaus controlled by a strong central organization - indeed, as we have seen, it has invested in scientific disorganization. Yet this disorganization is scientific in that, it has generated a galaxy of associations and initiatives similar to a corporate holding, with its own media (Radio Radicale). This is rational in relation to the goals of differentiating the supply of political initiatives, thus attracting broad sections of the electorate, NGOs and other political movements on the key issues, and putting a Radical stamp on themes that might otherwise be occupied by others. Thus, concluding on this point, the Radical Party's originality does not seem suicidal. Had the party pursued the classic goals described by Katz and Mair (1994), it

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[11] There is also a connection between rights and class politics that puts the Radical Party on tracks different from the ones of the traditional left. Pannella replied on several occasions already in the 1970s to the Communist leaders (objecting to the campaigns on rights as less important than salary and re-distribution) that the battles for rights are classed-based. In fact, citizens who can afford it can easily have access to rights (to divorce, abortion, euthanasia and so on) by using the exit option, i.e., travelling to jurisdictions where these rights are protected. A political agenda based on universal human rights - Pannella reasons - is a class-agenda and an agenda for the global South of the world.

would have become a marginal player in the political territory (campaigns, reforms, mobilization) key to the party strategy.[12]

The repertoire we have discussed is (at least in principle) a practical way forward for party politics in increasingly Europeanized and globalized arenas. In terms of strategy, the pragmatic approach to select major issues and build majorities around them has produced several results for the Radical Party, well-beyond its consistency in terms of MPs, MEPs and participation in government and international organizations like the European Commission. This is a valuable lesson for other parties of the left that are currently struggling with the four 'funerals' we described in sections 1 and 2 of this paper.

However, there are also limitations. First, no matter how effective and coherent the repertoire may be, it has not allowed the party to grow in membership or electorally. Campaigns to get at least ten thousand members have been very expensive in terms of human and economic resources: even when the party increased membership (in Italy or in specific countries, like the Central and Eastern European countries during their democratic transitions) it was impossible to maintain membership levels over the years. As for elections, possibly the only time of possible expansion was in 1979 (18 MPs and 2 Senators). But Pannella rightly notes that only 40-50 MPs would have enabled the Radical Party to become a player by replacing the Italian Socialist Party in the electoral landscape (Vecellio, 2010).

It is fair to say that for the Radical Party the electoral dimension is not the primary focus of activity. More important is the strategy to get results by pooling majorities across left and right, in Italy as well as in European global politics. In Italy, however, a good deal of the achievements of the Radical Party in Italian politics is contingent on the possibility to exploit an instrument like the referendum. History has shown that the political class (or the 'regime' as the Radicals would say) has suffered losses from the referendum in Italy, but it has also been able to close down the window of opportunity – with procedures that may be un-constitutional as the Radicals argue, but in any case politically effective, at least until now.

Secondly, there has been limited learning. In the 1970s and the 1980s the Radical Party has attacked the 'partycracy' and asked for reforms, typically by using legislation as main vehicle for policy change. It was historically important to take a firm position against the un-constitutional role of political parties in Italian politics, thus showing how anti-party sentiments are not necessarily channelled by right-wing populist parties. And certainly rights like divorce and abortion have to be first recognized by law to be protected. However, in the 1990s the parties have collapsed in Italy. True, patronage remains a frequent practice in Italy (Di Mascio, 2011). Behaviours and syndromes of the old partycracy still exist today, even if the parties that dominated Italian politics between 1950 and 1990 have disappeared. But a considerable body of research on public policy in Italy (Capano, 2002, 2003; Dente, 1990; Dente and Regonini, 1987; Regonini, 2001) shows that (a) parties are not necessarily the main determinant of policy outcomes and (b) management-organizational reforms at the level of public administration are more incisive than changes in legislation, especially if one considers the implementation stage of the policy process, and not only the decision-making stage. Put differently, the notion of changing the state by changing public policy is not absent in the radar

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[12] Concretely, the only possibility to turn to this model was the 1979 mini-boom of the party, but Pannella concluded that 19 MPs were not enough to switch to a classic party model (Vecellio, 2010).

of the Radical Party, as shown by their campaigns about how exactly existing laws on euthanasia should be applied, but is not given priority. Yet there has been limited learning on the part of the Radicals about how exactly this party can contribute to change through instruments that are not the law. The priority given to anti-party sentiments, and the emphasis on the parliamentary arena and reforms via the law are problematic. The Radicals seem to neglect the lessons provided by public policy analysis about the key role of the administrative arena and implementation networks in processes of sustainable change. This is why we conclude that learning has been limited or is still under way.

Thirdly, the transnational project, connected to the scientific disorganization of the party, is fragile and contradictory. It exposes the issue of capacity and skills to track complex agendas in different fora. The party has expanded capacity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin wall, with new members from countries other than Italy. But there has not been an explosion of members and party structures outside Italy. The exception is the capacity built around specific organizations of the Radical galaxy, most notably *Hands Off Cain* and *No Peace Without Justice*. The fact that after 30 years the Radicals did not manage to elect a single member of the European Parliament at the 2009 European elections aggravates the capacity problem given the importance of EU politics for this party. Having Members of the European Parliament means having access to the resources of Federations and party groups like the ALDE group, as well as being more capacity to orchestrate campaigns outside the EU. As one party leader observed in an interview with the authors, "to go to Moscow or Africa and campaign with the EP hat on is all together another story than starting from the offices in Rome" (November 2010). And the world has changed since 1989-1992: European Union has lost credibility in world politics because it has violated its own values (on migration) and as beacon of human rights and democracy (as shown by the disillusionment about the EU in the East of Europe).

It is not just an issue of capacity to intervene in so many different multi-level governance and parliamentary arenas. Transnationalism and the trasnparty choice have generated a gap between organizational structures and real-world leadership in the party. The statute of the transnational party (1993) is practically in a vacuum and has not been implemented (Vannucci, 2007). This permanent emergency (to borrow the expression from Vannucci, 2007) has led to a party dominated by a small group and the charismatic leader. There is friction between the libertarian vision of the party, the design of complex deliberative organizational architectures, and the concentration of party activities around a small group of people.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we have described and explained the political repertoire of the Radical Party and appraised it. In terms of theory-building, our findings show that the Radical Party is not simply a curious outlier with suicidal tendencies in the rational theory of parties (Katz and Mair, 1994). The repertoire we have illustrated is rational in relation to a political strategy that is oriented to mobilization, consensus-building, and policy change. This is rational for parties and more generally movements that want to secure results but for structural reasons cannot become a major party in the electoral landscape. With this repertoire, the Radical Party has provided a challenge to the cartelization processes under way. As Bardi (1996: 348) observes "The Radical Party was the first

explicit challenger of the cartel-dominated party system and of party per se". The anti-cartel stance has been effective in securing that anti-party sentiments are not necessarily captured by the populist right and can be channelled towards reform.

Empirically, we have shown that this repertoire provides an effective response to the four challenges of representation, media politics, Europeanization and globalization, with the three important limitations described above. We cannot categorize the party as yet another fringe party, given its position within institutions (including a Ministerial position in 2006-2008; a Commissioner post; the status within the United Nations structure and the current vice-Presidency of the Italian Senate). Looking at different campaigns and the historical evolution of the Radical Party, we have established that this subject can mutate according to the different contexts and fora: it is an NGO in the UN context, a member of single-issue coalitions (in the case of divorce in Italy or the establishment of the international criminal court), a movement in the campaign for freedom of research, and an active promoter of new discourses that can aggregate different political actors at different level (think of the battle against prohibitionist policies on drugs in the European Parliament and global-international fora).The results achieved on the death penalty moratorium, female genital mutiliation and the establishment of the international criminal court also qualify the Radical Party as an exception to Lawson's observation that international and trasnational parties 'do little' in global politics (Lawswon, 2006).

This leaves us with the question of the future of the party and what future research could usefully engage with. Clearly, the future of the party is a problem - Marco Pannella has been 'the' charismatic leader of the party. Not a dictator, since over the years other personalities have challenged his leadership, but the members have always opted for Pannella at the party conferences where alternatives were feasible. The fact is that it is difficult to imagine how a party based on fragile organizational structures, with a few thousands members in Italy and the rest of the world, could still play a role in the media, Italian politics, the EU and the UN without a personality like Pannella. Perhaps this Party will dissolve and remain an episode of the Italian political history of the past. Perhaps we will simply see another, different, Radical Party in the future. Perhaps leaders will become less necessary given the spread of their campaigns, and the party will become more libertarian and less leader-centric in its own organization. Or this unique repertoire will be gradually diffused to other parties of the left in Europe, and therefore germinate elsewhere, with new organizational forms and new protagonists. Indeed, if there is a single lesson we would like to draw, is that the West-European left has several reasons to look at this experience as a possible way to transform the four 'funerals' into relatively happy parties. Indeed, one question for further research is why this repertoire has not diffused via emulation to other parties.

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