Europe Report N°210 9 Dec 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The property issue is one of the most intractable knots in the settlement of the Cyprus dispute, without which stability in the Eastern Mediterranean remains fragile. Greek and Turkish Cypriots own tens of thousands of buildings and parcels of land on both sides of the divided island. A convincing plan to resolve conflicting claims would give great support to reunification efforts and persuade external partners of Cypriots’ will to find a compromise, even as the 2011 electoral calendar sets what is in effect a deadline for the present negotiations. But as Cypriot politicians and Turkey fail to come to terms, the property question is increasingly being atomised by individual actions and the courts – a process that will be more expensive, slow and inefficient for all than a comprehensive property settlement. With a comprehensive deal proving elusive, heavy court and administrative penalties and the actions of Cypriot individuals mean that the property issue can no longer be ignored or avoided. New ideas are urgently needed.
The passage of time since the events that led to mass displacements – 47 years in some cases – means many properties have been assigned to new users by local authorities, sold, destroyed or significantly developed. The two communities have grown apart and established new socio-economic structures in their respective areas, having lived behind closed front lines for three decades and interacted only superficially since crossing points opened in 2003. They have adopted opposing approaches to property, Greek Cypriots emphasising return and Turkish Cypriots resettlement, and a body of local legislation reflects this divergence. There are also disagreements about the amount and value of property each community owns on both sides of the island.
Attempts to find a negotiated settlement have tried to tackle property, which has implications for the individual and collective human rights of the island’s 210,000 displaced persons and their heirs, at least one fifth of the population, the majority of whom are Greek Cypriots. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s efforts in 2002-2004 were the most comprehensive. But these failed, together with the broader talks, and left more questions open than they provided answers. While there is general agreement that Cyprus should become a bizonal, bicommunal federation, the two communities have diametrically opposed ideas about how bizonality should affect the right to return. Greek Cypriots stress displaced persons’ right to return and enjoy property as enshrined in international law. Turkish Cypriots emphasise that they should remain the majority in their zone and that this will impact how many Greek Cypriots can regain their property. In fact, fewer than one quarter of Greek or Turkish Cypriots say that they will definitely or probably return to their old homes if these fall under the other constituent state.
In the absence of a political settlement, more Cypriots are turning to costly and slow judicial solutions. International courts have found Turkey liable for blocking Greek Cypriot access to their properties in the north and imposed substantial financial penalties. But the courts are recognising that long-term users also have rights and that individual owners should be able to voluntarily exchange properties. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) especially has been encouraging Cypriots to rely on domestic remedies, such as a Turkish Cypriot property commission to which several hundred displaced Greek Cypriots have already applied.
In the round of reunification talks underway since September 2008, the two leaders have agreed in principle to settle the property dispute through a mix of restitution, exchange and compensation. Any compromise should balance the rights of displaced Greek Cypriots with those of the displaced Turkish Cypriots, as well as take into account the accommodation needs of a mutually agreed number of Turkish settlers. This migration to Cyprus contravened the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but the immigrants’ children may now have been born and lived their whole lives on the island.
The failures of the past three decades prove that neither side is likely to achieve its ideal settlement, and flexibility is needed. Turkish Cypriots should recognise that while they want to retain a majority in their constituent state, two thirds to three quarters of property in their area was owned by Greek Cypriots in 1974, when the present division of the island took place. They must understand that the right to restitution holds great importance in Greek Cypriot discourse. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders must remind their populations that the division of the island has no legal basis.
Politicians in Ankara, especially, should relaunch and sustain their outreach to Greek Cypriots to assure them of Turkey’s commitment to seeing through a settlement and return of property. For Ankara in particular, indefinite occupation would invite higher costs, both in court judgements and in its efforts to join the European Union. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, should pay heed to international court rulings that challenge their conviction that the rights of original owners and their heirs supersede all other considerations. A compromise solution will have to accept that not all Greek Cypriots will automatically be able to return to their old properties within a new bizonal, bicommunal federation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the leaderships of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities:
1. Convert the Greek Cypriot proposal to link negotiations on property, territory and settlers into the first stage of the international conference on all negotiating topics proposed by the Turkish Cypriots.
2. Commission in both zones a joint, rapid and representative audit of land owned by the other community to achieve a mutually agreed categorisation of properties.
3. Prepare expeditiously and jointly an economic impact study on the various proposals to redevelop property in both zones, including examination of the feasibility for normalisation of the ghost resort of Varosha ahead of a political settlement.
4. To bridge disagreements on basic approaches to the property issue:
a) both sides should state that all pre-1974 home owners have the right in principle to reclaim their primary residence;
b) the Greek Cypriot side should prepare public opinion to accept that rights to restitution in a Turkish Cypriot constituent state may be restricted by bizonality and in mutually agreed cases such as public usage;
c) the Turkish Cypriot side should offer as much reinstatement of property ownership as possible within the context of bizonality, while protecting the rights of the current users, especially if they themselves are displaced and are using the property as a primary residence; and
d) alternative accommodation should be provided for those who have to vacate current housing and have no other home.
To the Greek Cypriot leadership:
5. Make legal provision for property exchanges between displaced owners from both sides that have been approved by the Turkish Cypriot Immovable Property Commission (IPC).
6. Stop discouraging Greek Cypriot applications to the IPC.
7. Allow Turkish Cypriots residing in the north who own abandoned properties in the south to seek the same remedies open to owners residing elsewhere.
To the Turkish Cypriot leadership:
8. Ensure fairness and transparency in IPC procedures, compensation calculations and payment details and commit to extending its mandate beyond the end-2011 deadline.
9. Remove residency restrictions on inheritance of property in the north by heirs of displaced Greek Cypriots.
10. Support ongoing talks with a construction freeze on Greek Cypriot-owned property in the north.
To the Turkish leadership:
11. Relaunch and sustain efforts to assure Greek Cypriots of Turkey’s commitment to a settlement, including the handing back of property and territory along the lines of previous UN plans.
Nicosia/Istanbul/Brussels, 9 December 2010